by Kamal Y. Azari
Commonly, the failure of the MENA states is blamed on the people who live there, who are viewed by many as incapable of creating civil societies or living by the rule of law. However, this blame is mostly misplaced. It is equivalent to a situation in which an architect designs a building without doing soil analysis for the foundation, then blames the occupants of the building when the foundation fails. The architects of the democratic models employed in the MENA cannot blame the lack of civil society and the rule of law for the model’s failure.
The failed states of MENA have one thing in common: the designers of this modern democratic form that takes neither cultural diversity nor the strengths of traditional forms of government into account. If we want to reform the governments of the region, we need to look closely at the modern democratic model of government—and explore why it has fallen short.
Over ninety percent of countries (more than 150 nations) gained their independence since the end of World War I. The political orders of most of these countries have been created and imposed by the dominant powers of the time, mostly European democracies and the United States. Yet of the newly independent countries, only about 5% are considered liberal democracies. The majority can be classified either as failed states or states dominated by autocratic and corrupt rulers who control all aspects of social, political, and economic life, preventing personal or communitarian social growth and curtailing the activities of independent entrepreneurs.
To understand these tragedies, one must examine the fundamentals and the impact of the democratic model imposed upon the traditional societies of MENA. The shortcomings of the state in sectering Iraq did not delay the imposition of the same model of government in Afghanistan; the long struggle of South Sudan for independence, with massive aid from Western powers, resulted in the establishment of another centralized democracy—and another battle between rival warlords over control of the state treasury.
The political models imposed on these newly independent states are all forms of US constitutional democracy. By and large, the models, drawn up in written constitutions, include a central government with three supposedly coequal branches: executive, legislative, and judicial. Almost all devote a portion of the constitution to the protection of human rights against the excesses of the state.
This model has served Western nations reasonably well, with some notable exceptions, including the rise of Hitler in Germany and the current disconnect between the needs of the average citizen and the actions of the government in the United States. However, the adoption of this model in the formerly colonized and traditional communities of MENA has taken a different route. These imposed political orders have prevented the natural growth of civil society and the natural emergence of the rule of law, becoming instruments of state power instead. The result is despotic rulers who preside over nations with few “haves” and many “have nots,” and little attention to civil liberties. The check and balance mechanism intended for modern governments has instead become the instrument of expanded state power and social control, with the judiciary and legislature being used as instruments to stifle individual liberties. Instead of cradles of democracy, governments have become the breeding ground of massive corruption and autocratic control, creating levels of omnipotent state power that would have been unimaginable to even the absolute rulers of the past.
Another consideration has been the imposition of federal or confederate political structures. When there are two or more large ethnic identities, such as in South Sudan, such federal political order compounds the problem by superimposing two identical modern political structures on top of each other, without addressing the inherited and existing cultural contradictions of the electorate. Again and again, this model suffers from the same problems. The interests of autocratic regional rulers clash, and federalization leads to civil war.
One reason for the failure of these corrupt governments is their inability to account for and respond to the cultural diversity and traditional political structures of the MENA region. This failure has helped to sustain conflicts in several nations, from Iraq to Syria and Libia.
Unfortunately, instead of adjusting for the shortcomings of the centralized government, whether federal or central, model, Those responsible, have responded to political crises by sending more money and military power to buttress ineffective state structures. In each case, these efforts resulted in prolonged misery for the indigenous population, without any end in sight. In retrospect, it is strange that none of these horrible outcomes were foreseen. Even more bizarre is the fact that with minor variations, the dominant powers have employed the same heavily‑centralized government model repeatedly, yet Expected a different outcome. A political model that has regularly created autocratic states and humanitarian disasters has never been altered—or even considered for alteration.
To understand how to correct this failure, one must start by understanding the purposes of models. A model is first a mental construct. It presents a possible explanation or action plan that will create or explain a particular outcome. It is built, tested, and altered as needed to solve a phenomenon or achieve the desired result. We use models to design aircraft, build better computers, explain the economic behavior, and even create forms of government.
In the case of modern democracy, the first such model was The Articles of Confederation, formed in what is now the United States after the end of the Revolutionary War. The Articles failed, only to be replaced by the constitutional model that has served the United States—and served as a model for the world—ever since. Yet, at least in the United States, this model has undergone several changes over time to adjust to changing societal conditions, including amendments to provide civil rights to minority groups.
While focusing exclusively on this model, Most of these constitutions have consistently neglected the possibilities offered by the indigenous governmental models of the MENA, which are often more decentralized and more flexible. The strengths these models offer have been blithely ignored.
The transformation of traditional societies to modernity is an evolutionary process. It requires the application of the existing knowledge about communities, use of indigenous customs of power-sharing, and social structure. The emergence of the modern political order in Europe was based on the growth of similar communities that caused the development of civil society and the rule of law. The reality is that it took over three hundred years to gradually evolve.
Despite ourt wishes for an instant and categorical Transformation in the MENA, it is simply not possible. However, the transition to a healthier democratic structure can be expedited if governments incorporate aspects of modern democracy and traditionally decentralized government in MENA as positive forces for social change.
How might it work? The process will require political scientists to employ the scientific method. In this case, a new political model would be tested on a small scale in a defined environment. The predictions and outcomes would provide data that would allow the model builders to adjust their hypotheses and refine the model. If one model failed to create or explain desirable outcomes, other models should be investigated in a similar process. And to build a model that might work for MENA, we need to take a closer look at traditional government structures in the region, and the opportunities they offer
The opinion expressed do not necessarily reflect those of ITC
